

Strategy Research Project

Securing America's Future through Security Cooperation

by

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USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

Securing America's Future through Security Cooperation

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Abstract

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Securing America's Future through Security Cooperation

Helping other countries better provide for their own security will be a key and enduring test of US global leadership and a critical part of protecting US security, as well. Improving the way the US government executes this vital mission must be an important national priority.¹

—Robert M. Gates
Former Secretary of Defense

Secretary Gates' comments are indicative of a United States defense strategy transition that will rely heavily on security cooperation as a key pillar for increasing global security. DoDD 5132.03 defines security cooperation as “activities undertaken by DoD to encourage and enable international partners to work with the United States to achieve strategic objectives. It includes all DoD interactions with foreign defense and security establishments, including all DoD administered security assistance programs that: build defense and security relationships that promote specific U.S. security interests, including all international armaments cooperation activities and security assistance activities; develops allies and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations; and provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to host nations.”² The United States Army, as the principle proponent for land power will play a key role in supporting the ends, ways and means for executing security cooperation.

This research project will examine how the Army assesses to determine requirements and prioritization to achieve the ends, ways and means for security cooperation. Important to this analysis is an examination of how the Army will posture forces in order to meet existing and emerging requirements. Finally, an assessment of current Army implementation strategy will determine if adjustments are required to

accomplish security cooperation missions and identify areas of risk. A review of the ends, ways and means for Army security cooperation will assist in understanding the framework of my analysis.

Ends, Ways and Means

Army security cooperation is coordinated and conducted throughout the Geographic Combatant Commander (GCC) areas of responsibility (AOR). Although Department of State (DoS) leads and provides oversight for security cooperation efforts through its bureaus, offices, and country teams, Department of Defense (DoD) security cooperation activities are coordinated and conducted throughout the GCC AOR to achieve the following ends: (1) Build defense relationships that promote specific U.S. security interests; (2) Develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations; and (3) Provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to a host nation.

The Army provides agility, versatility and depth to its “Prevent, Shape and Win” strategic framework. To meet the demands of a globalized, complex security environment, future Army forces require the capabilities and capacity to prevent conflict and shape the environment simultaneously as part of a joint force and multinational coalition. These demands will likely require the Army to provide enhanced security cooperation support to GCC Theater Campaign Plan (TCP) objectives to build defense and security relationships, build partner military capacity, and strengthen institutions as a means of protecting common security interests, preventing conflict, and prevailing in war.

Theater Armies serve as the focal point for directed Army security cooperation activities within their GCC’s AOR. This ensures Army security cooperation efforts

directly support Combatant Command (CCMD) campaign plans and objectives as well as DoS regional and country objectives. Army security cooperation focuses on the following areas to achieve the objectives: (1) Operational capacity and capability building; (2) Human capacity / human capital development; (3) Institutional capacity / security sector reform; (4) Support to institutional capacity / civil-sector capacity building; (5) Combined operations capacity, interoperability, and standardization; (6) Operational access and global freedom of action; (7) Intelligence and information sharing; (8) Assurance and regional confidence building; (9) International armaments cooperation; and (10) International suasion and collaboration. Army security cooperation executes four broad categories of means in support of Army security cooperation efforts: (1) individuals and units, (2) capabilities, (3) programs—the Army supports over 50 specific security cooperation programs—and (4) equipment.³

Security cooperation is not new concept; in fact the Army has been intricately involved in this activity throughout its history; U.S. policy and guidance indicate that SC provides a strategic benefit for solidifying diplomatic ties and empowering allies and partners. The DoD supports these goals through many different venues; some examples are Special Forces units perform foreign internal defense (FID) which is one of their core tasks involving training, equipping, advising and assisting allied and partnered nations and Army conventional forces involved in building partner nation security capability in contested areas in both Iraq and Afghanistan.⁴ The U.S. sees a necessity to increase global security which has led to an increased emphasis on security cooperation in regards to policy and guidance.

National Strategy

The struggling global economy, reductions in defense spending and the stress of eleven years of protracted conflict all elements of national power have led civilian and military leaders to place an increased emphasis on security cooperation as a means for increasing global stability and securing common interests. In his National Security Strategy, the President directs a strategy that enables the U.S. to build and integrate capabilities that can advance national interests and interests shared with other countries; a strategy that must start at home by recognizing a need to grow the U.S. economy and reduce the deficit.⁵ The National Military Strategy of the United States highlighted theater cooperation and humanitarian assistance as a facilitator to strengthening international and regional security; requiring that forces be globally-available but regionally focused in order to increase collective security skills with a wider range of partners.⁶ The National Defense Strategy focuses on the use of security cooperation programs to strengthen the host nation's ability to increase their security posture by: "(1) Encouraging partner nations to assume lead roles in areas that represent the common interests of the United States and the host nation; (2) Encouraging partner nations to increase their capability and willingness to participate in a coalition with U.S forces; and (3) Facilitating cooperation with partner militaries and ministries of defense..."⁷

The Honorable John M. McHugh and General Raymond Odierno in their 2012 Army Posture statement concludes that the role of the Army is to prevent, shape and win. Under the role of shape, they stated:

Second, our Army must help to **shape** the international environment to enable our combatant commanders to assure our friends and contain our enemies. We do that by engaging with our partners; fostering mutual

understanding through military to military contacts and helping them build the capacity to defend themselves. These actions are an investment in the future that the Nation cannot afford to forego. We must cultivate positive relationships before they are needed and be a reliable, consistent and respectful partner to others.⁸

The Strategic Guidance published by the Department of Defense in January 2012 reflected the President's strategic direction and identified key military missions of which building partnership capacity remains important for sharing the costs and responsibilities of global leadership and security and directing that "whenever possible, we will develop innovative, low-cost and small footprint approaches to achieve our security objectives, relying on exercises, rotational presence, and advisory capabilities."⁹ Securing America's future with our partners is not solely a DoD function; it requires a collaborative interagency effort. In 2010, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton published the first Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR) which was modeled after the DOD Quadrennial Defense Review and reinforces the importance of preventing violent conflict stating, "We must improve our capability to strengthen the security of states at risk of violence both through effective, accountable security and justice systems able to guarantee internal security and through stronger civilian institutions and effective justice systems."¹⁰ The February 2010 QDR report states that greater emphasis must be placed on building the capacity of our partners and that the role of the United States as a leading security provider will continue with increased activities in regards to hands on efforts with security cooperation missions conducted primarily in host countries to train, equip, advise and assist host nation forces in becoming more proficient at providing security to their populations and protecting their interests.¹¹

The strategic rationale for security cooperation is dual-purposed: it empowers regional partners and allies and it sustains the defense industrial base through increased United States exports; both of which can be advantageous to the U.S. Strong relationships with partners and allies can help prevent conflict, build strong coalitions if conflict arises and develop credible forces. The U.S. can sell or transfer defense equipment through its foreign military sales program. The assistance provided can provide countries with capabilities to confront security challenges, increase collaboration and interoperability and professionalize their military. Conducting training and exercises is also beneficial for improving capabilities of participating forces by improving professionalism, leadership, interoperability and cultural awareness.¹² I would argue that military to military engagement through human interaction is the more vital outcome of security cooperation and where the U.S. must weight its effort; technology is easily transferrable but developing quality leaders takes time and commitment. Finally, strengthening partner nation internal security capacity can mitigate the ability of terrorists and other nefarious actor abilities to exploit ungoverned areas as safe havens from which to recruit, indoctrinate and train fighters who plan attacks against US and allied interests. Key outcomes from security cooperation is the potential to build relationships between the United States and partnered militaries in ways that can enhance professional relationships, enable foreign policy, and promote peace and stability.¹³

Clearly, one can ascertain from the verbiage by our senior leaders that America is committed to sharing the responsibilities for global security. The National objective is clear – preserve American global leadership and maintain our military superiority by

maintaining a ready and capable force while providing a stabilizing presence. Security cooperation will be one of the methods to shape the global environment.

The current state of the union may present some challenges for security cooperation throughout all of the GCC. Tighter budgets, transitioning from sustained combat operations in Afghanistan, the rebalance to Asia-Pacific and the continued uncertainty of sequestration will require prioritization at the highest levels in order to provide assistance to our allies and partners. The President has indicated a commitment to Afghanistan for continued security force assistance to Afghan Army and Police forces beyond the December 2014 conclusion of combat Operation and leaders are still working out the details to determine the force package.¹⁴ The Army's approach to security cooperation must focus on the ends, ways, and means to ensure that resources are applied appropriately across the combatant commands.

The Army prioritizes security cooperation by four country categories in accordance with the guidance for the employment of the force (GEF). The categories are: (1) Global core partners; (2) Key Army partners; (3) Regional partners; and (4) special interest countries. Global core partners collaborate with the U.S. in multiple regions of the world, possess advanced defense institutions and are capable of exporting security globally. Key Army partners are designated by the CSA and possess capable tactical units, have maturing military institutions and demonstrate a potential to export security abroad. Regional partners are determined by the GCC who deems these countries as essential to achieving TCP endstates. The Army goal for regional partners is that they possess a capacity to secure their territory, provide access and participate in U.S./Coalition operations. Special interest countries are exceptional cases

that the Army engages in support of U.S. national policy.¹⁵ US national interests such as issues of human rights and expanding democracy will remain considerations for determining whom the United States will partner with and the parameters of assistance. Key to achieving the ends is an assessment that determines the ways and means for achieving objectives.

Assessments

Assessing is part of Army culture. Unit readiness, leader development, potential/performance and training are a few examples of assessments that Army units routinely provide. The procedures for assessing, both formal and informal, provide information which enables decision makers to visualize, describe, detect and direct action towards achieving a goal. Standardized procedures for assessing seem to be more prevalent and detailed at the tactical and operational level; potentially a byproduct of a perceived necessity to more closely centralize and manage organizations to ensure standardization and an ability to interoperate and prioritize resources.

Security cooperation is an extension of our foreign policy and national security objectives which requires regional input from U.S. Ambassadors and Geographic Combatant Commanders (GCC) for the execution of an effective program. The U.S. is employing a whole of government approach with input from DoS, USAID and the DoD for SC planning and execution with no single agency identified as the overall lead; currently a parallel process is employed to meet objectives. The process for coordination is informal and relies heavily on relationships to ensure unity of effort and purpose. The conduct of security cooperation requires an understanding of our partners – his culture, history, religious and ideological motivations, geography all play a key role in his perceptions of the world. Our ability to assimilate these characteristics and

correlate them to national interests plays an intricate role in developing priorities of support. Each of the organizations that influence security cooperation sees the problem and solution from a different optic based on their organizational culture which can lead to a lack of unity of effort for support to allied nations and partners. The inter-agency has acknowledged a lack of synchronization in planning and although pre-decisional and not fully implemented, the 3D planning guide serves as a reference tool to assist planners with understanding the purpose of each agency's plans, the processes that generate them and to assist in identifying opportunities for coordination among the three in an effort to synchronize activities and improve unity of effort. This document is a step in the right direction – it opens lines of communication for dialogue and serves as a framework for decision makers. The 3D planning guide also acknowledges the reality that significant hurdles exist in developing unified plans based on shared assessments due to organizational culture, resources, timelines and even personalities.¹⁶ An important outcome of the 3D Planning guide is the Three-D Planning Group (3DPG) that created a more formal process by establishing a steering committee focused on collaborative planning, synchronization, integrating processes, education and training that will reduce the seams between the organizations and provide greater synergy for achieving the National strategy. This effort is a step in the right direction and should provide some unity of effort even though it is still based heavily on informal coordination and relationships.¹⁷

The Army's ability to support TCPs and priorities requires the constant assessment of the effects of SC activities. The Army security cooperation strategy states that "ASCCs must regularly assess and modify SC requirements to ensure they

remain relevant to both GCC and Army objectives, determine ineffective programs, and identify additional opportunities requiring engagement of senior Army leaders with foreign counterparts or inter-agency partners. “Methodology for assessments will be developed in the Army campaign support plan and will leverage the capabilities of the Army global outlook system (ARGOS) and theater security cooperation management information system (TSCMIS).”¹⁸ AR 11-31 states that “assessment is integral to the Army’s ability to adapt to an evolving security environment.” The regulation directs Army units to “assess the effectiveness of their security cooperation activities in light of goals and objectives delineated in the ASCP and, upon request, submit such assessments to HQDA.”¹⁹ The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy directed the Security Cooperation Reform Task Force (SCRTF) to conduct an assessment of the SC program and develop recommendations to ensure the program can succeed in meeting the demands for increased emphasis and reliance that national policy and guidance places on defense relationships with allies and partners. The SCRTF identified 56 recommendations designed to improve the program. A key finding of the task force was that “because DoD neither mandates country-level planning nor currently has a Department-wide approach to such planning, it does not assess, anticipate, prioritize or address partner requirements as well as it should.” The document further identifies that a lack of a DoD common planning methodology hampers the ability to present a synchronized plan to inter-agency partners, Congress, industry and partner countries – reading between the lines indicates a loss of credibility.

²⁰ The findings recommended the development of a planner’s handbook to address issues such as institutionalizing and integrating country-level SC planning, identifying

and prioritizing partner capabilities, identifying country and regional capability gaps and developing solutions.

A comprehensive assessment model within the DoD will provide the framework for assessing the effectiveness and efficiency of security cooperation programs and can determine if programs are achieving the desired objectives. A shared common language across all GCCs will contribute to improved decision making, management and would provide senior level decision makers with the analysis required to review programs, develop priorities and apply resources that are synchronized across the inter-agency, thus improving the probability of focusing on national objectives.

Changing a bureaucratic process is a not a fast process and some would argue that a review of security cooperation missions being executed today would demonstrate that the US is making progress building strong and enduring relationships, increasing allied and partner capacity and providing access to foreign territories. Some may cite the Warsaw initiative fund as a program that continues to be an extremely profitable for the US and our NATO partner and ask “why change and put additional requirements on already overburdened commanders?” The rationale is simple – there are several significant differences between the circumstances we face today and how we operated in the past – the requirement to operate in an international environment that is intricately connected requires greater oversight of a decreasing budget to ensure we are prioritizing the most critical activities to meet objectives. The logic for standardization is simple; leaders must be good stewards of our resources and ensure we are applying them wisely. How is the Army doing in regards to developing an assessment standard?

The Army is making progress towards establishing an assessment framework. In 2007, Army policy for security cooperation provided detailed information in regards to ends, ways, and means for the strategic methodology to support GCCs and highlighted assessment as an integral part of the Army's ability to adapt, however, the document fell short of providing information on how to assess.²¹ The Army is currently undergoing staffing and revision of the security cooperation regulation and the draft document provides detailed information on assessments that consists of monitoring, evaluating progress and recommending or directing action for improvement. The document requires collaboration planning and assessments with partner nations and measures of performance/effectiveness as a basis for assessing progress. Additionally, units are required to enter post activity assessment data in the theater security cooperation management information system (TSCMIS).²²

A standardized assessment tool implemented from the DoD should be utilized by all services and include a training program to ensure that all personnel who work with, maintain, or provide input into the model possess the necessary skills to ensure its functional use. If implemented correctly, the assessment model will inform decision makers at all levels how to best apply and resource security cooperation missions in each region.

In 2008, the International and Security and Defense Policy Center of RAND sponsored a workshop with a focus on developing security cooperation assessments and guidance. Workshop key themes focused on setting direction, designing assessments, preparing for assessment, conducting assessments and explaining assessments and included participants for organizations that have a vested interest

such as combatant commands and sister services. A critical question to answer was why do we need to assess? The findings identified the need to defend programs, regulatory requirements, dialogue with Congress and quality assessment.

Assessing to correctly determine requirements requires identifying stakeholders who have a role in determining mission requirements and the roles to include:

- “1) Determining the need for a program
- 2) Determining objectives (i.e. output and outcome)
- 3) Designing activities
- 4) Controlling resources (e.g. funding, manpower, equipment, infrastructure) and
- 5) Conducting activities...”²³

Understanding roles helps to delineate responsibilities for assessment and can build efficiency in reporting at each level so that communication is occurring vertically and horizontally. This graphic depiction from the Rand study provides an potential approach for implementing an Office of the Undersecretary Defense/Policy (OUSD/P) assessment framework that would provide the framework for assessment.

This approach would allow the Army to provide transparency through OUSD/P and would provide the necessary direction, definitions and standardization required to integrate all aspects of security cooperation missions in support of the guidance for employment of the force.




Figure 1: A Potential Approach to Implementing an OUSD/P Assessment Framework

Joint Doctrine Note 1-13, in final revision, has provided a model for implementation and identifies the necessity to conduct assessments at each echelon. The process should begin with a strategic assessment by the GCC in coordination with country teams to “determine overarching gaps in capability or capacity need to be addressed within the context of U.S. country and regional interests, objectives, and goals.” This assessment will serve as the basis for planning, coordination and more detailed assessments at the operational and tactical levels which can capture and better articulate assessment and better align tasks to specific requirements. The model consists of five steps (see figure below) which will provide measurable feedback towards goal accomplishment:




Figure 2: (Joint Doctrine Note 1-13 Model)

This assessment methodology can be applied in day to day activities and provide understanding of progress towards meeting the goals of programs.²⁴

In 2010, ISAF adopted the commander's unit assessment tool (CUAT) as a model that provided a complete assessment for the Afghan Army and Uniformed Police. The report includes the status of personnel and logistical supplies, training numbers and a mission capability report. The report was completed with input by both advisor and his Afghan leadership. The CUAT as a reporting and assessment tool established a sense of accountability and reinforced dialogue where there was previously little, if any at all. The CUAT, as a reporting tool, was important because it not only serves as an objective and subjective assessment tool for manning, equipping and training but it also provides district and provincial leadership and their coalition partners with the ability to make decisions on future training plans. The CUAT could serve as a tactical level

framework for communicating the status of specified tasks for security cooperation missions. A key imperative in each of the models is the necessity of a feedback loop at each level that facilitates communication and understanding of priorities, thus enabling commanders at each level to apply these priorities to develop plans that resource security cooperation missions to meet regional and national priorities.

Leaders are critical to the assessment process. A common thread during multiple senior leader discussions is the necessity and benefits of face to face engagements with foreign leaders. Relationships have and will remain critical to making progress on priorities and developing long term mutually beneficial relationships is leaders business. An important factor in developing assessments for the conduct of SC mission is determining the endstate for not only the U.S. but also allies/partners and adversaries as well. GCC and Service component commanders are the right people to share with partners and allies U.S core interests – universal values, security, economic prosperity, democratic values, human rights, and a commitment to international order.²⁵ This can serve as a starting point in determining how each organization can benefit from a military relationship that “serves our mutual security and the broader security and prosperity of the world.”²⁶

Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Michele Flournoy and Shawn Brimley, a key advisor recently offered their thoughts on what they believe to be a new, expansive and expanded defense portfolio. They observed: “In broad terms...the US military will increasingly face three types of challenges: rising tensions in the global commons; hybrid threats that contain a mix of traditional and irregular forms of conflict; and the problem of weak and failing states.”²⁷

Security cooperation must remain a collaborative inter-agency effort between the DoS, DoD and USAID and other supporting agencies to ensure that the U.S. is focusing all elements of national power to complement both US and partner nation goals and objectives. U.S. security cooperation efforts in South America utilizing U.S. Special Forces conducting foreign internal defense serves as an example of how relationships, assessments and employing interagency can set conditions for positive results.

“Columbia’s resurgence from the brink of becoming a failed narco-state in the late ‘90s to the second strongest economy in South America is due to no small part to a rich history of USSOF efforts in Columbia,” said Lieutenant Colonel Will Griego, a Special Forces Officer who has been in and out of Columbia conduct various security cooperation missions since 1994.²⁸

The United States under the Clinton administration executed a stability operation named Plan Columbia aimed at fighting illicit drugs, increasing rule of law, protecting human rights, expanding economic development and instituting judicial reform. One of the five central components of the plan was continued development of the Colombian Military and “assistance for the Colombian National Police to continue efforts at eradication.”²⁹ United States and Colombian government efforts did not begin to reach their stated objectives until the election of President Alvaro Uribe, who developed a plan for “Columbians by Columbians” and utilized a United States inter-agency effort to focus on development, eradication and training/advising missions.

Today, the Columbians continue to pursue a consolidation plan with the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) and Ejercito de Liberacion Nacional (ELN).³⁰ Conditions within Colombia have improved and the country is on the right path

to being a recognized leader in South America, however, improvements did not occur easily. Military to military assessments of what needed to be done occurred and improvements in proficiency occurred at the individual and small unit level due to the professionalism and dedication of U.S. Special Forces Teams and other Army trainers.

This was not necessarily the case at the operational and strategic levels; a General Accounting Office report conducted in October 2000 key finding indicated the USSOUTHCOM lacked a detailed assessment of COLMIL requirements causing inputs to be based on incomplete information and on “intuitive assessments” to address COLMIL needs. These findings led to a DoD study to improve support and ensure counterdrug assistance was effective.³¹ Robert Ramsey attributes success of security cooperation efforts in Colombia to three key factors: (1) President Alvaro’s leadership and vision; (2) the work of the Military Group in Colombia that provided an security assistance and established meaningful relationships; and (3) professionalizing Colombia security forces. Ramsey also cautions that the model used in Colombia is not exportable due to factors such as the strategic and operational environment.³² Plan Colombia demonstrates a security cooperation relationship that played a role in supporting U.S. interests even though implementing and executing had as still has many friction points. Key is that the Army will continue to support SC efforts and lessons learned from Colombia should be reviewed to determine how the Army positions to resource the GCC.

How the Army Positions to Resource the GCC:

The Army strategy to resource security cooperation missions is: (1) support to operations in Afghanistan; (2) regionally align forces in support of the GCC; (3) leverage National Guard State Sponsored programs; (4) Special Operations Forces; and (5)

forward stationing of Soldiers in Korea and Europe in order to continue to provide a deterrent and investment with our partners and allies. Secretary of Defense, Leon Panetta directed that, “whenever possible, we will develop innovative, low cost, and small footprint approaches to achieve our security objectives, relying on exercises, rotational presence, and advisory capabilities.”³³

The Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff directs the geographic combatant commands through the guidance for employment of the force (GEF) to develop theater campaign plans (TCP) that cover a multitude of operations. In general, these plans tend to be fairly broad and require Theater Armies to conduct mission analysis to determine the specific effects, tasks to be achieved and how to resource.³⁴ The Army campaign support plan in conjunction with the Theater Army Campaign Support and the country support plan revise the Army strategy to support security cooperation. This process serves to determine resources to apply to building partner capacity.³⁵

The priority for resourcing missions will remain Afghanistan where U.S. forces have direct responsibility for security - tactical commander missions to train, advise, and assist host nation forces will remain the focus for sourcing. This mission is accomplished using the resources of the modular brigade augmented as necessary based on conditions.³⁶ Recently, the Army has adopted the Security Force Assistance Brigade (SFAB) as the solution to increasing Afghan Army and Uniformed Police capability and capacity. The SFAB focuses on training and mentoring Afghan National Security Forces vice leading combat and counterinsurgency missions; deploying at about half of the strength of the fully manned battle space owning brigade - each security force assistance brigade is 1,400 to 2,000 soldiers, as opposed to the 3,500 to

4,000 soldiers in a fully manned brigade. The SFAB is able to tailor the personnel deploying to ensure that they possess the appropriate functions necessary to train Afghan security forces. Deployed forces tend to be officer and senior noncommissioned officer centric due to their experience and expertise.

The Army is preparing the SFAB for deployment by providing specialized training in combat advising skills from the 162nd Infantry Brigade stationed at Fort Polk, Louisiana culminating in the execution of their mission readiness exercise to validate unit preparedness for executing their wartime mission. The Army utilizes the Army Force Generation Model (ARFORGEN) to resource the force structure required for the anticipated security training mission that will last beyond the December 2014 drawdown date originally outlined by President Barack Obama. Supporting continued operations in Afghanistan should not pose a challenge to the Army to resource and deploy ready units; the mature theater, institutional training focus on Afghanistan, and experience of leaders deploying should provide the U.S. the subject matter expertise required to increase Afghan capacity.

The Army plans to align units and brigades, referred to as regionally aligned forces (RAF), to a GCC who will then be able to utilize them as they deem fit in support of their security cooperation efforts. In a recent interview, a senior Army leader stated that the first regionally aligned force has been given 93 different missions to conduct in 2013 in Africa Command.³⁷ The RAF initiative can provide a proof of concept for security cooperation employment for conventional forces and refinement of the ways and means for expanding military to military relationships, however, this concept should be closely monitored to determine if it is effective. Some immediate challenges that a

Brigade Commander would have in preparing for a mission in AFRICOM would be providing a training plan to include cultural/language training, weapons training, area familiarization and composition of the partnering units. My assessment is that a RAF will struggle to maintain proficiency in decisive operations training while preparing personnel to become regionally oriented advisors that deploy select personnel from the unit to support SC missions. The ARFORGEN model combined with regular reassignment and attrition of Soldiers will make it difficult for conventional forces to develop lasting proficiency in advisory capabilities across the formation.

The National Guard's State Partnership Program links U.S. states with foreign nations to promote and enhance bilateral relations. It supports homeland defense by nurturing dependable collaborative partners for coalition operations in an era of persistent conflict.³⁸ National Guard members are unique in that they can apply both military and civilian skills to foster democracy, encourage economic development, and promote regional cooperation and stability. They are also able to create long-term relationships due to long duration assignments within the same unit. In a recent briefing to Army War College students, a senior AFRICOM leader praised the state partnership program and credited their efforts with increasing security within the region.³⁹ The SPP received accolades from all senior leaders with exposure to the program however, there are some challenges associated with this program. The partnership program is a title 22 funded state program executed and run at the discretion of the Governor who has the authorities for determining the scope of the relationship between participants and the readiness of Soldiers deploying which could lead to a lack of synchronization with the GCC, however, this is not an insurmountable obstacle. DoD instruction 5111.20 has

established formal procedures and requirements to provide oversight and a forcing function for GCC and National Guard Bureau communication/coordination – a first step that could lead to a synchronized effort towards meeting objectives.

ARSOF are geographically oriented, language qualified and possess a cultural understanding that conventional forces lack. Their capability to integrate with foreign militaries, understand their environment and gain trust provides the best opportunity to forge lasting relationships and accomplish security cooperation missions. The most publicized mission in the contemporary operating environment is focused on direct action missions against terrorists and their networks, however, the core foundation for Special Forces was foreign internal defense focused on training and advising foreign security forces. Working with foreign militaries requires a level of competence and maturity not always found in our conventional force formations. Members of the Special Forces A-Teams are trained in a minimum of one military occupational specialties which enables the detachment to operate independently to support emerging mission requirements.

The success of SC efforts will be heavily reliant on conventional forces and special operations forces (SOF) integration. The Army special operations forces (ARSOF) provide unique capabilities and skills required to ensure mission accomplishment. The Army is advocating a hybrid model for supporting missions. The CSA stated:

As Army regular forces become available, they will increasingly integrate with Army Special Operations Forces to promote trust and interoperability with allies and build partner nation capacity where mutual interests are at risk from internal and external enemies⁴⁰

The lack the institutional knowledge of working with foreign security forces and the global demand for SOF will continue in Afghanistan and other areas as the U.S. continues the counterterrorism fight. One approach to conducting a security cooperation training that capitalizes on the skills of each force could be:

SOF-GPF collaboration is one whereby GPF train partners in basic skills and, when the foreign security force has matured, hand the effort over to SOF to conduct advanced individual and small unit training. In some cases, once SOF has concluded the advanced training, the partner nation's military may be ready for sustainment training via large-scale multinational exercises shepherded by US GPF.⁴¹

Doctrinal, organizational, educational and training revisions will be required to integrate SOF – conventional forces. Successful integration and interoperability is dependent upon understanding each other's systems, capabilities and limitations. Findings from GPF - SOF study identified some key limiting factors that could impact interoperability. The study identified inadequate addressing of the capabilities and limitations of SOF, lack of discussion on the contributions of SOF in professional military education programs, SOF operating concepts and the role of SOF in engagement with foreign countries. Additionally, integration between the two forces is largely based on relationships which are insufficient to meet future needs of the force⁴². A study commissioned by the CJCS and conducted by the Joint and Coalition Operational Analysis (JCOA) Division, Joint Staff, J7 to ensure that lessons learned from the past decade of operations are captured and instituted offered some recommendations for integration but falls short of codifying an implementation plan to ensure institutionalizing the lessons.⁴³ The Army must update DOTMLPF to ensure that SOF-conventional force integration becomes a long term capability if it is going to remain a key component

for joint employment for security cooperation and are able to capitalize on the skills sets that ARSOF possesses for conducting security cooperation.

Currently, the 162nd Infantry Brigade serves as the facilitator to ensure that conventional forces are trained to perform advisor and security force assistance skills. The 162nd is continuing to reorganize in order to better train units tasked with performing SFA/SC missions and is developing a construct in conjunction with the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) to meet a sustained flow of units to be trained in security forces assistance in support of Afghanistan and combatant commanders. As part of the reorganization, the Brigade created a security force assistance element to serve as the primary knowledge and skills repository which will enable the preparation of RAF units to operate with SOF.

TRADOC has identified gaps with security cooperation lessons learned and is working diligently to develop training, education and doctrine to support country planning, programs, budgeting, global force management and inclusion of the interagency in security cooperation missions.⁴⁴ In addition, Army authorities are limited to familiarization type activities such as individual task and weapons training and exercises which limits the ability to fully interact with foreign forces; however, leaders are working with the OSD and Joint Staff to expand security cooperation authorities.⁴⁵

The need for a institutionalizing an Advisor capability within the Army should be explored. Some considerations for developing the structure of the organization were recommended by LTC(R) John Nagl who recommended the creation of a permanent 20,000-member Advisor Corps, responsible for creating advisory doctrine as well as overseeing the training and deployment of 750 advisory teams of 25-Soldiers each.⁴⁶

LTG(R) David Barno, the former Commanding General of the Combined Forces Command – Afghanistan from 2003-2005 recommended creating an organization focused on building partner nation capacity and sourcing it through a Special Operations led Advisory and Assistance Command that would oversee the training of conventional forces assigned to it.⁴⁷

The question becomes is the Army postured to support security cooperation missions? The approach that the CSA has laid out makes sense from a resource standpoint to continue to resource and rely on the Army to expand its support to GCCs, however, my assessment is that units will struggle to maintain an acceptable level of readiness. Leaders will ensure that units are prepared to support missions and will execute to the high standard but will find it necessary to prioritize training and resources. The ARFORGEN model, although effective for supporting combat operations in both Iraq and Afghanistan will be challenged to manage RAF to the GCC and our Soldiers will find it challenging to maintain proficiency in skills such as cultural awareness, language training, advising and conducting missions in support of decisive action. Army leaders and soldiers have proven to be adaptable however, conventional forces should remain globally focused in order to be prepared to fight and win our Nations battles, if required.

Confronting shared security challenges in coming years will test the capacity of the Department of Defense (DOD) to effectively partner with its allies, other governmental agencies, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and at times even the private sector. The last comprehensive legislation enacted to improve partnering capacity within DOD was the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization

Act of 1986.⁴⁸ A finding in the CJCS study was to “pursue development of a Goldwater-Nichols-type act to mandate and develop a framework for increased interagency coordination for a whole of government approach” to meeting strategic objectives.⁴⁹

Conclusion

The evolution of security cooperation to build partner capacity will continue in the coming years and the concept of partnering will receive increased emphasis as a cost saving instrument of power with the potential to avert future conflicts. Focus increasingly on low cost/small footprint capacity building efforts with partners that share our interests will remain a key strategy in the future. A senior EUCOM leader stated the best money the DoD is currently spending is funds supporting building partner capacity and that face to face relationships are the most important aspect of security cooperation.⁵⁰ Personal relationships and exposure to different regions provides the opportunity for mutual understanding of cultural differences which can ultimately lead to stronger partnerships. The Army will play a vital role ensuring our nations interests and increasing global security in an extremely complex and interconnected world. Securing our future and the mutual interests of the US and our partners will rely heavily on the application of soft power. Security cooperation is the most cost effective ways and means to accomplish this and is a viable strategy for employment of the force. Building lasting relationships based on trust, mutual respect and an understanding that a coalition of partners can accomplish more together than unilaterally is key to our security cooperation missions. Developing the assessment tools to properly resource and providing ready and capable forces is the short term task the Army must focus on to ensure that the United States remains the global leader and partner of choice as we continue to advance our interests into the 21st Century.

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